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The	Silent	Shapers	of	our	Thoughts:	The	
Relevance	of	the	Concept	of	“Vision”	in	the	
Aftermath	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis
I N TRODUCT ION
The	word	“vision”	is	a	familiar	one	within	the	con-
text	of	the	biblical	revelation,	as	well	as	in	the	history	
and	tradition	of	the	Christian	church.	In	Acts	26:19,	
the	Apostle	Paul	tells	King	Agrippa	that	he	“was	not	
disobedient	to	the	vision	from	heaven”	that	he	received	
from	the	Lord	Jesus	on	the	road	to	Damascus.	Robin	
Griffith-Jones	in	his	book	on	the	life	of	the	Apostle	
Paul	has	observed	that	“any	conversation	about	society,	
politics,	or	ethics	will	want	to	have	words	for	a	world	in	
which	justness	dwells	.	.	.	We	need	to	believe	that	our	
fragmentary	world	offers	more	than	just	willful	or	fan-
tastical	grounds	for	hope”	(2004,	p.	111).	Robert	Benne	
has	written	that	“vision”	is	one	of	the	“three	compo-
nents	of	the	Christian	tradition	that	must	be	publicly	
relevant”	(2001,	p.	6).	Benne	proceeded	to	assert	that	
“the	vision	is	Christianity’s	articulated	account	of	real-
ity.	It	is	a	comprehensive	account	encompassing	all	of	
life;	it	provides	the	umbrella	of	meaning	under	which	all	
facets	of	life	and	learning	are	gathered	and	interpreted”	
(2001,	p.	6).		
Within	the	realms	of	modern	economics,	especially	
those	conversations	that	take	place	in	the	pages	of	most	
academic	journals	and	the	sessions	of	many	professional	
meetings,	however,	the	use	of	this	term	will	prob-
ably	result	in	a)	an	offer	to	provide	directions	to	the	
sociology	department,	or	b)	a	question	as	to	how	this	
concept	can	be	quantified	in	such	a	way	that	it	could	
be	included	as	an	explanatory	variable	in	a	properly	
specified	regression	equation.	If	we	widen	the	scope	of	
our	inquiry	from	“economics”	to	“political	economy,”	
the	proposition	that	the	concept	of	vision	is	relevant	to	
an	examination	of	economic	issues	and	controversies	is	
more	likely	to	receive	a	favorable	hearing.	Such	a	con-
clusion	is	supported	by	the	observation	that	the	debate	
over	the	financial	crisis,	with	respect	to	both	its	cause(s)	
and	the	relative	merits	of	alternative	institutional	and	
policy	responses,	has	been	couched	in	moral	terms	from	
the	very	beginning.	
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This	essay	seeks	to	explore	the	following	questions:
1)		What	is	an	economic	vision?
2)		Why	are	economic	visions	important?
3)		How	is	this	concept	relevant	to	an	understanding	of	
the	global	economy	in	the	wake	of	the	financial	crisis?
4)		What	might	Christians	think	about	the	concept	of	
“vision”	in	economics?
WHAT  I S  AN  ECONOMIC  V I S I ON?
Almost	30	years	ago,	Robert	Heilbroner	posed	the	
question	of	why	economists	often	come	to	different	con-
clusions	about	matters	of	mutual	interest,	especially	when	
the	issue	at	hand	is	what	he	termed	“the	cosmological	
problem	of	economics,	namely,	the	social	configurations	of	
production	and	consumption”	(1984,	p.	682).	Referring	
collectively	to	the	scholarly	work	of	Karl	Marx,	John	
Maynard	Keynes,	and	Joseph	Schumpeter,	Heilbroner	
concluded	that	these	economists	“seem	to	have	resolved	
the	cosmological	problem	not	by	looking	into	their	tele-
scopes	but	into	their	hearts,	projecting	into	the	skies	the	
constellations	they	wished	to	see	there”	(1984,	p.	683).	
Drawing	upon	Schumpeter’s	analysis,	Heilbroner	used	the	
term	“vision”	in	order	to	describe	these	alternative	projec-
tions,	employing	Schumpeter’s	definition	of	a	vision	as	a	
“pre-analytic	cognitive	act”	(Heilbroner,	1990,	p.	1109;	
Schumpeter,	1954,	p.	41).	He	maintained	that	these	
visions	were	“acts	that	not	only	fulfill	the	essential	task	
of	reducing	raw	perceptions	to	ordered	concepts	but	that	
also	imbue	these	concepts	with	qualities	of	inevitability	
and	rightness”	(1990,	p.	1110)	and	that	“what	is	impor-
tant	is	to	see	all	visions	as	expressions	of	the	inescapable	
need	to	infuse	‘meaning’	—	to	discover	a	comprehensible	
framework	in	the	world”	(1990,	p.	1112).	Heilbroner	
asserted	that	“Marx’s	vision	of	human	emancipation,	real-
ized	through	class	struggle,	is	the	starting	point	and	the	
end	point	of	the	analysis	contained	within	Capital,”	and	
“(Adam)	Smith’s	visionary	deistic	order	precedes	and	
guides	the	processes	of	self-ordering	growth	described	in	
the	Wealth of Nations”	(1990,	p.	1110).	
How	can	we	explain	the	existence	of	alternative	visions	
among	a	community	of	individuals	who	are	committed,	in	
Heilbroner’s	words,	to	“a	shared	analytic	method?”	(1984,	
p.	685).	One	hypothesis	that	was	put	forth	by	Heilbroner	
consisted	of		“differing	specifications	of	the	empirical	
(emphasis	in	the	original)	elements	from	which	economic	
models	are	constructed	—	that	is,	of	different	real-world	
attributes	that	appear,	in	stylized	form,	as	part	of	the	sce-
nario”	(p.	685).	He	argued,	“The	introduction	of	new	
empirical	elements	.	.	.	is	clearly	capable	of	altering	the	
conclusions	of	which	analytical	processes	drive	the	argu-
ment,	as	well	as	suggesting	different	likelihoods	of	political	
outcomes”	(1984,	p.	686).	Heilbroner	presented	“David	
Ricardo’s	insertion	of	the	empirical	assumption	of	limited	
land	resources	into	Smith’s	(initial)	model,”	which	had	
“immense	consequences	for	political	economy	as	well	as	
economics,”	as	an	example	(p.	686).	The	economic	impli-
cations	of	the	revolution	in	information	and	communica-
tions	technology	might	very	well	constitute	a	more	con-
temporary	application	of	this	argument.	A	second	explana-
tion,	which	was	presented	by	Heilbroner,	consisted	of	“the	
divergent	effects	that	follow	from	different	perceptions”	of	
the	competitive	process	in	a	capitalist	system,	maintaining	
that	“competition	for	Marx	is	very	different	from	competi-
tion	for	Schumpeter	or	Keynes”	(1984,	p.	687).	In	our	
present	age,	there	is	a	tremendous	difference	among	the	
public	at	large	between	those	who	view	the	market	process,	
both	domestically	and	internationally,	as	a	zero-sum	affair	
that	redistributes	a	given	quantity	of	wealth	and	those	who	
see	trade	and	exchange	as	a	cooperative	means	of	expand-
ing	the	supply	of	resources	that	can	be	devoted	to	both	
public	and	private	endeavors.	Fundamental	differences	in	
vision	can	also	help	to	explain	the	wide	variation	in	grand	
narratives	—	“big	stories”	—	that	have	unfolded	in	the	
aftermath	of	the	financial	crisis,	both	with	respect	to	the	
cause	of	these	developments	and	the	efficacy	of	alternative	
policy	and	institutional	responses.	
Aside	from	these	previous	elements,	Heilbroner	placed	
considerable	emphasis	on	what	Mark	Blaug	has	defined	
as	“appraising	value	judgments”	as	a	source	for	vision-
ary	economic	thought.	Blaug	states	that	judgments	of	
this	type	“refer	to	evaluative	assertions	about	states	of	the	
world,	including	the	desirability	of	certain	kinds	of	human	
behavior	and	the	social	outcomes	that	are	produced	by	
that	behavior”	(1980,	p.	132).	In	Heilbroner’s	view,	judg-
ments	of	this	type	are	intertwined	with	the	“pre-analytic	
cognitive	acts,”	which	constituted	Schumpeter’s	definition	
of	a	vision	(1984,	p.	688).	Andrea	Maneschi	(2000,	p.21)	
has	commented	that	“the	collection	of	economists	that	
Schumpeter	judged	to	be	endowed	with	vision	(capital-
ization	in	the	original)	is	highly	heterogeneous,”	includ-
ing	Karl	Marx	and	John	Maynard	Keynes,	but	excluding	
Adam	Smith	and	David	Ricardo.	By	contrast,	Hans	Jensen	
(1976,	p.	260;	1984,	pp.	76-77)	has	contended	that	the	
work	of	both	Smith	and	Keynes	began	with	a	“visionary	
preamble”	that	led	to	a	“conceptualized	reality,”	defined	
as	“a	mental	picture	of	the	world	that	is	devised	by	an	
innovating	economist	.	.	.	for	the	specific	purpose	of	
serving	him	as	a	substitute	for	the	socio-economic	actual-
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ity	in	which	he	lives.”	Maneschi	has	also	observed	that	
Schumpeter	drew	a	connection	between	the	concepts	of	
vision	and	ideology	in	the	following	manner:
Now	it	should	be	perfectly	clear	that	there	is	a	wide	
gate	for	ideology	to	enter	into	this	process	(of	devel-
oping	scientific	propositions).	In	fact,	it	enters	on	
the	very	ground	floor,	into	the	pre-analytic	cogni-
tive	act	of	which	we	have	been	speaking.	Analytic	
work	begins	with	material	provided	by	our	vision	of	
things,	and	this	vision	is	ideological	almost	by	defi-
nition.	It	embodies	the	picture	of	things	as	we	see	
them,	and	wherever	there	is	any	possible	motive	for	
wishing	to	see	them	in	a	given	rather	than	another	
light,	the	way	in	which	we	see	things	can	hardly	be	
distinguished	from	the	way	in	which	we	wish	to	see	
them	(Schumpeter,	1954,	p.	42).
Thomas	Sowell	(1987,	p.	8),	who	provided	the	main	
title	of	this	essay	with	his	observation	that	“we	all	have	
visions”	that	serve	as	“the	silent	shapers	of	our	thoughts,”	
has	also	made	use	of	Schumpeter’s	descriptions.	His	own	
definition	of	a	vision,	in	an	economic	context,	is	“our	
sense	of	how	the	world	works”	(1987,	p.	14)	and	a	sense	
of	causation	(emphasis	in	the	original)	that	is	“more	like	a	
hunch	or	a	‘gut	feeling’	than	it	is	like	an	exercise	in	logic	
or	factual	verification.	These	things	come	later,	and	feed	
on	the	raw	material	provided	by	the	vision”	(1987,	p.	
16).	Sowell	has	also	concluded	that	visions	represent	“the	
foundations	on	which	theories	are	built”	(1987,	p.	14)	and	
may	be	“religious,	tribal,	or	ideological	in	nature”	(Sowell,	
1980,	p.	8).	
Drawing	upon	all	of	these	previously	cited	sources,	the	
operating	definition	of	an	economic	vision,	for	the	purpos-
es	of	this	essay,	is	as	follows: an initial outlook on economic 
affairs that not only provides the basic foundation for future 
assumptions and theories, but that also furnishes all of these 
constructs with an over-arching sense of meaning and purpose.
WHY  ARE  E CONOM IC  V I S I ONS  IMPORTANT?
Sowell’s	comments	with	respect	to	visions	are	not	lim-
ited	to	their	definition,	but	extend	to	their	significance	and	
meaning	as	well.	As	a	case	in	point,	he	has	asserted	that	
“visions	are	like	maps	that	guide	us	through	a	tangle	of	
bewildering	complexities”	(1987,	p.	13),	and	he	elaborated	
on	the	importance	of	what	he	termed	“social	visions”	in	
the	following	statement:
Social	visions	are	important	in	a	number	of	ways.	
The	most	obvious	is	that	policies	based	on	a	certain	
vision	of	the	world	have	consequences	that	spread	
through	society	and	reverberate	across	the	years,	or	
even	across	generations	or	centuries.	Visions	set	the	
agenda	for	both	thought	and	action.	Visions	fill	in	
the	necessarily	large	gaps	in	individual	knowledge	
(1987,	p.	16).
Economic	visions,	especially	when	they	are	commu-
nicated	in	the	language	of	metaphor	and	analogy,	also	
represent	an	attempt	to	provide	a	broader	set	of	moral	
justifications	for	particular	economic	institutions	and	poli-
cies.	W.	Fred	Graham	has	concluded	“that	social,	political,	
and	economic	change	—	secular	change,	to	sum	up	in	one	
catchword	all	that	we	persist	in	seeing	as	nonreligious	—	
needs	religious	meaning	and	zeal	to	provide	the	dynamic	
to	bring	it	about,”	and	visions	are	designed	to	furnish	that	
sense	of	meaning	(1978,	p.	24).	In	more	contemporary	
language,	they	constitute	what	post-modern	scholars,	such	
as	Jean-Francois	Lyotard,	have	described	as	a	“great	narra-
tive,”	concluding	that	both	the	Enlightenment	and	Marxist	
narratives	“deploy	the	same	historicity	as	Christianity,	
because	they	conserve	the	eschatological	principle,”	even	
though	the	first	two	visions	are	secular	in	nature	(1997,	
p.	97).	William	Milberg	has	referred	to	explanations	of	
this	type	as	a	“metanarrative,”	defining	them	as	a	“narra-
tive	that	purports	to	capture	the	totality	of	a	given	field	
and	thus	that	serves	to	structure	its	knowledge”	(2001,	p.	
409).	The	importance	of	these	narratives	was	supported	
by	Heilbroner	when	he	maintained	that	“there is no man-
ner of describing a social universe without these valuational 
elements”	(emphasis	in	the	original)	and	that	the	“very	
humanness	(of	what	we	call	‘society’)	brings	wish,	hope,	
purpose,	and	understanding	into	the	elemental	stuff	of	the	
social	universe	itself”	(1984,	p.	689).	A	central	theme	of	
this	line	of	thought	is	that	alternative	visions	of	political	
economy,	as	opposed	to	competing	theories	or	discrepan-
cies	in	empirical	analysis,	are	largely	responsible	for	situa-
tions	in	which	people	who	share	an	equal	degree	of	con-
cern	about	a	particular	problem	(e.g.,	global	poverty)	arrive	
at	very	different	evaluations	with	respect	to	whether	or	not	
certain	processes,	such	as	an	increased	degree	of	economic	
integration	between	nation-states,	make	a	net	contribu-
tion	to	the	alleviation	or	the	exacerbation	of	the	problem	
at	hand.	The	distinction	between	visions,	paradigms,	and	
theories,	both	in	sequence	and	substance,	is	an	important	
one.	Drawing	upon	the	work	of	Thomas	Kuhn	(1970,	
p.	10),	Sowell	has	written	that	“whether	in	science	or	in	
social	thought,	visions	or	inspirations	come	first	and	are	
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subsequently	systematized	into	paradigms,	which	embrace	
specific	theories,	and	their	narrowly	focused	hypotheses,	
which	can	be	tested	against	evidence”	(1987,	p.	10).	Heinz	
Kohler	has	added	that	“a	model	is	a	logical	derivative	of	
a	vision,	a	simplified	representation	of	what	reality	must	
be	like	if	the	vision	is	true”	(1997,	p.	102).	This	process,	
however,	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	an	end	result	where	
particular	visions	are	vindicated	or	invalidated,	on	the	
whole,	by	the	available	evidence	at	hand.	Sowell	has	ana-
lyzed	this	situation	as	follows:
Definitive	evidence	cannot	be	expected	on	the	
grand	general	sweep	of	a	vision.	A	great	deal	of	
partial	evidence	may	be	accumulated	on	each	side,	
but	the	evidence	for	and	against	one’s	own	vision	
can	be	weighed	differently,	and	being	convinced	is	
ultimately	a	subjective	process.	Even	in	those	cases	
where	a	clear	confrontation	in	empirical	terms	can	be	
arranged	and	evidence	produced,	every	lost	battle	on	
one	front	does	not	signal	the	end	of	the	war,	much	
less	unconditional	surrender.	When	hypotheses	
deriving	from	a	particular	vision	are	contradicted	by	
evidence	in	the	form	in	which	they	were	first	assert-
ed,	they	may	nevertheless	be	salvageable	in	a	less	
extreme	or	more	complex	form	(1997,	p.	206).	
If	we	take	“globalization”	as	a	case	in	point,	a	number	
of	its	proponents,	both	in	previous	eras	as	well	as	in	our	
present	time,	have	constructed	their	arguments	on	the	
foundation	of	what	might	be	termed	the	“liberal	vision”:	
the	free	movement	of	goods,	services,	financial	capi-
tal,	information	and	people	across	national	boundaries.	
Adherents	to	this	vision	believe	that	this	movement	will	
not	only	promote	prosperity	for	all	who	participate	in	the	
market	process	but	will	also	bring	about	a	greater	degree	
of	cultural	understanding,	weaken	the	appeal	of	nationalist	
or	xenophobic	sentiments,	and	further	the	cause	of	peace.	
Richard	Cobden’s	campaign	for	a	liberal	trading	regime	
in	19th	century	Britain	provides	an	excellent	historical	
example.	In	an	essay	marking	the	100th	anniversary	of	free	
trade	in	the	United	Kingdom,	Wilhelm	Ropke	recalled	
that	“Cobden’s	battle	cry	was	‘free	trade,	goodwill,	and	
peace	among	nations’”	(1969,	p.	103).	Bernard	Semmel	
concluded	that	“Cobden	saw	free	trade	as	inexorable	truth,	
proceeding	as	it	did,	logically,	from	the	principles	of	the	
science	of	political	economy,	and	as	so	universally	benefi-
cial	that	to	oppose	it	was	the	devil’s	work.	For	Cobden,	
free	trade	was	virtually	a	scriptural	principle,	and	much	of	
English	non-conformity	shared	his	view”	(Semmel,	1970,	
p.	159).	More	recently,	Alan	Ebenstein	has	written,	in	his	
biography	of	Nobel	Laureate	Friedrich	von	Hayek,	that	
Hayek	“rejected	economic	nationalism”	—	a	philosophy	
which	is	opposed	to	a	liberal	international	economic	order	
—	because	“it	hinders	the	dream	of	one	human	race”	
(2001,	p.	52).	Similar	sentiments	were	expressed,	during	
the	time	period	between	the	two	World	Wars,	by	Edwin	
Cannan:
It	is	conceivable	that	in	some	far	future	the	apostles	
of	separatist	nationalism	may	realize	their	ideal	of	
cutting	up	mankind	into	a	few	score	or	hundred	
economically	independent	units	which	will	exchange	
nothing	except	perhaps	shells	and	poison	gas.	But	if	
that	is	ever	to	be,	it	certainly	is	not	yet,	and	it	is	not	
likely	that	the	youngest	of	us	will	live	to	see	it.	For	
my	own	part	I	have	sufficient	faith	in	mankind	to	
think	that	a	gradual	breaking	down	of	national	barri-
ers	is	more	probable	(1929,	p.	391-392).	
It	has	been	argued	by	scholars	such	as	John	Gray	
(1998),	Paul	Dembinski	(2004),	and	Ernesto	Screpanti	
and	Stefano	Zamagni	(2005),	that	the	liberal	vision	is	
inherently	utopian	in	nature,	and	that	this	is	a	character-
istic	which	it	shares,	ironically,	with	the	particular	visions	
of	socialism	that	inspired	the	attempts	at	economic	plan-
ning	in	the	20th	century.	As	an	example,	Screpanti	and	
Zamagni	(2005,	p.	463)	observed	that	neoclassical	eco-
nomic	thought	and	Marxism	share	“four	basic	philosophi-
cal	bearings,”	the	last	of	which	is	“an	optimistic	metanar-
rative	of	the	fates	of	humankind	.	.	.	that	accounts	for	the	
subject’s	capacity	to	mold	the	world	to	satisfy	a	universal	
purpose	conceived	as	the	product	of	reason.”	Let	us	sup-
pose,	nevertheless,	that	one	finds	this	liberal	vision	of	
international	economic	integration,	perhaps	in	a	restrained	
version	that	has	abandoned	any	utopian	inclinations,	to	
be	both	persuasive	and	appealing.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	
how	does	one	respond	to	the	critics	of	globalization	who	
argue	that	this	is	a	false	vision,	the	pursuit	of	which	leads	
to	an	increase	in	the	degree	of	inequality	in	the	global	dis-
tribution	of	income	and	wealth	(both	between	and	within	
countries),	a	weakening	in	the	authority	of	sovereign	
governments	and	democratic	institutions,	and	the	dilu-
tion	of	cultural	identities?	At	this	point,	perhaps	it	would	
be	appropriate	to	remember	Thomas	Sowell’s	previously	
cited	admonition:	“When	hypotheses	deriving	from	a	par-
ticular	vision	are	contradicted	by	evidence	in	the	form	in	
which	they	were	first	asserted,	they	may	nevertheless	be	
salvageable	in	a	less	extreme	or	more	complex	form.”	If	
the	expansion	of	“the	extent	of	the	market,”	to	use	Adam	
Smith’s	phrase	(1981,	p.	31),	across	the	globe	has	pro-
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duced	an	asymmetric	distribution	of	benefits	and	costs,	
why	is	this	the	case?	Is	the	liberal	vision	fundamentally	
flawed	and	incapable	of	repair,	or	is	there	the	possibility	
for	revision	and	amendment?
HOW  I S  TH I S  CONCEPT  R E L EVANT  TO  AN 
UNDERSTAND ING  O F  THE  G LOBAL  E CONOMY 
IN  THE  WAKE  O F  THE  F INANC IA L  CR I S I S ?
The	international	political	economy	of	the	twenti-
eth	century	was	dominated	by	an	intellectual	competi-
tion	between	alternative	capitalist	and	socialist	visions	
of	the	appropriate	economic	order.	With	the	collapse	of	
the	Soviet	Union	and	the	end	of	almost	all	attempts	to	
administratively	plan	an	entire	economy,	it	would	seem	
that	what	Graham	has	characterized	as	the	“eschatologi-
cal	religious	visions	of	Marx”	faded	as	well	(1978,	p.	25).	
Even	if	this	is	the	case,	however,	recent	historical	experi-
ence,	especially	in	the	wake	of	the	recent	financial	crisis	
and	global	recession,	would	strongly	suggest	that	the	glob-
al	debate,	at	the	level	of	vision,	is	far	from	over.	Critics	of	
the	liberal	vision	were	quick	to	suggest,	beginning	with	
the	first	rumblings	in	stock	markets	around	the	world	as	
the	housing	“bubble”	began	to	deflate	in	2007,	that	these	
events	were	a	logical	consequence	of	giving	free	rain	to	
the	“unfettered”	forces	of	the	marketplace,	especially	in	
an	age	of	international	financial	integration	and	increas-
ingly	complicated	avenues	for	investment.	With	the	pas-
sage	of	time,	supporters	of	the	free	market	launched	an	
“intellectual	counter-attack,”	maintaining	that	the	source	
of	our	economic	difficulties	was	more	likely	to	be	found	
in	political	(counter-productive	policies	and	regulations)	
and/or	cultural	(a	lack	of	personal	discipline	with	respect	
to	matters	of	credit	and	debt)	sources.	This	contrast	in	
perspectives	was	summarized	by	Christopher	Caldwell	
(2008,	p.	7)	in	the	following	manner:
Is	our	present	financial	crisis	the	result	of	a	mistake	
or	a	crime?	Is	it	evidence	of	incompetence	or	of	cor-
ruption?	Is	its	remedy	to	be	sought	in	committee	
rooms	or	in	individual	consciences?	.	.	.	The	public	
has	no	settled	idea	about	whether	the	global	finance	
system	seized	up	last	summer	because	it	was	misman-
aged	or	because	it	was,	in	a	moral	and	metaphysical	
sense,	wrong.	
Could	it	be	that	the	alternative	answers	to	Caldwell’s	
questions	that	are	provided	by	different	analysts	of	our	
economic	problems	stem,	to	a	greater	degree,	from	their	
“pre-analytic	cognitive	acts”	than	from	their	reading	and	
interpretation	of	the	available	evidence?	If	someone’s	fun-
damental	thoughts	about	economic	matters	have	been	
shaped	by	an	outlook	that	is	characterized	by	a	relative	
lack	of	trust	in,	or	suspicion	about,	the	market	process	of	
voluntary	exchange	between	willing	parties,	they	are	more	
likely	to	embrace	a	point	of	view	which	attributes	the	
financial	crisis	to	criminal,	corrupt,	or	at	least	unethical	
behavior.	At	the	present	time,	the	“Occupy	Wall	Street”	
protests	would	seem	to	qualify	as	an	example	of	this	phe-
nomenon.	By	contrast,	those	who	are	predisposed	to	be	
skeptical	about	the	efficacy	of	various	forms	of	public	
economic	intervention	are	more	likely	to	conclude	that	the	
crisis	was	largely	due	to	the	incompetence	or	poor	manage-
ment	of	policymakers.	In	the	context	of	current	affairs,	the	
“Tea	Party”	movement	might	very	well	serve	as	a	case	in	
point.	Finally,	observers	who	emphasize	the	importance	of	
cultural	factors,	as	opposed	to	economic	or	political	forces,	
are	more	likely	to	stress	the	failure	of	individual	conscienc-
es	with	respect	to	“living	within	one’s	means”	in	both	the	
public	and	the	private	sector.	Authors	and	commentators	
within	the	Christian	community	who	cast	a	critical	eye	on	
all	forms	of	debt	provide	a	relevant	and	timely	example	of	
this	perspective.
Discerning	the	influence	of	alternative	visions	in	
constructing	a	grand	narrative	of	recent	events	may	also	
be	complicated	by	the	ongoing	presence	of	what	David	
Henderson	has	categorized	as	“do-it-yourself	econom-
ics,”	or	DIYE	(2001,	p.	14).	Henderson	claims	that	the	
following	list	represents	some	of	the	“characteristic	doc-
trines”	of	DIYE:
1)	 Industries	or	activities	can	be	classed	as	either	‘essen-
tial’	or	‘non-essential,’	or	ranked	in	order	of	priority.
2)	 Governments	should	ensure	self-sufficiency	in	essen-
tials,	and	provide	systematic	support	to	products,	
industries,	and	sectors	which	have	high	priority.
3)	 International	competition	is	primarily	between	states.
4)	 Exports	represent	a	gain	to	each	country	and	imports	
a	loss.
5)	 Tariffs,	import	restrictions	and	export	subsidies	serve	
to	increase	total	employment.
6)	 Administrative	actions	to	reduce	or	constrain	the	size	of	
the	labor	force	will	ease	the	problem	of	unemployment.
7)	 Actions	undertaken	for	profit,	or	more	broadly	from	
self-interest,	are	open	to	question	as	such	(pp.	14-15).
In	the	wake	of	recent	events,	perhaps	a	motion	could	
be	made,	and	seconded,	to	add	two	more	“doctrines”	to	
this	list	that	are	peculiar	to	the	financial	crisis.	The	former	
tends	to	be	emphasized	by	adherents	of	the	political	“left,”	
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while	the	latter	finds	support	primarily	among	supporters	
of	the	political	“right”:
8)	 The	financial	crisis	was	almost	entirely	the	result	of	
“unrestrained	self-interest”	and	“greed,”	which	by	
necessity	led	to	decisions	that	were	unethical	at	best	
and	criminal	at	their	worst.
9)	 The	financial	crisis	was	almost	entirely	the	result	of	
excessive	levels	of	private	and	public	debt,	which	
proves	that	all	forms	of	debt	are	undesirable	and	are	to	
be	avoided,	regardless	of	the	purpose	or	function.
Do	these	“doctrines,”	to	use	Henderson’s	phrase,	
constitute	the	elements	of	an	economic	vision	that	is	
consistent	with	the	definitions	provided	by	Schumpeter,	
Heilbroner,	and	Sowell?	Given	that	these	propositions	
represent,	for	the	most	part,	reactive	judgments	about	
economic	events	that	have	been	articulated	on	a	case-by-
case	basis,	without	any	kind	of	overarching	rationale	or	
justification,	it	would	be	difficult	to	categorize	them	as	
the	type	of	“pre-analytic	cognitive	act”	that	was	described	
by	Schumpeter.	John	Kay	(2005,	pp.	176-177)	has	also	
indirectly	supported	this	position	through	his	observa-
tion	that	“the	most	common	weakness	in	(DIYE)	is	the	
failure	to	understand	general	equilibrium	issues	.	.	.	The	
advocates	(of	DIYE)	‘know’	the	truth	of	what	they	say	
from	their	own	experience.”	Kay’s	argument	is	highly	rel-
evant	to	an	examination	of	the	question	of	why	so	many	
commentators	on	the	events	of	the	last	several	years	are	
fragmentary	in	nature,	focusing	on	only	one	explanatory	
variable,	whether	it	be	private	sector	greed,	public	sector	
incompetence,	debt	in	both	sectors,	or	some	other	causal	
factor.	Even	though	one	might	have	a	preliminary	deposi-
tion	toward	a	primary	catalyst,	a	fully	developed	vision	
should	include	all	plausible	contributions	to	the	situation	
at	hand,	including	the	insight	from	the	biblical	revelation	
and	Christian	tradition	that	we	all	“see	through	a	glass	
darkly,”	and	make	decisions	on	the	basis	of	imperfect	or	
inaccurate	information.	This	emphasis	is	reflected	in	the	
following	conclusion,	by	Tim	Besley,	Peter	Hennessy,	and	
additional	economists	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	
and	other	institutions,	in	response	to	an	inquiry	by	Queen	
Elizabeth	II:
The	failure	to	foresee	the	timing,	extent,	and	sever-
ity	of	the	crisis	and	to	head	it	off,	while	it	had	many	
causes,	was	principally	a	failure	of	the	collective	
imagination	of	many	bright	people,	both	in	this	
country	and	internationally,	to	understand	the	risks	
to	the	system	as	a	whole	(2009,	p.	3).
WHAT  M IGHT  CHR I S T I ANS  TH INK  ABOUT 
E CONOMIC  V I S I ONS  IN  G ENERAL ?
Given	the	teachings	of	Scripture	concerning	the	fall	
and	the	nature	of	man,	Christians	have	a	long	history	
of	healthy	skepticism	about	any	projects	for	the	reform	
of	social	institutions	that	appear	to	be	based	on	utopian	
premises	of	creating	a	“heaven	on	earth,”	or	some	approxi-
mation	thereof.	A	case	in	point	would	be	the	traditional	
(in	some	evangelical	Protestant	circles,	at	least)	interpre-
tation	of	the	biblical	account	of	the	Tower	of	Babel,	as	
recorded	in	Genesis	11:1-7:
Now	the	whole	world	had	one	language	and	a	com-
mon	speech.	As	men	moved	eastward,	they	found	a	
plain	in	Shinar,	and	settled	there.
They	said	to	each	other,	‘Come,	let’s	make	bricks	
and	bake	them	thoroughly.’	They	used	brick	instead	
of	stone	and	tar	instead	of	mortar.	Then	they	said,	
‘Come	let	us	build	ourselves	a	city,	with	a	tower	that	
reaches	to	the	heavens, so that we may make a name 
for ourselves (emphasis	added)	and	not	be	scattered	
over	the	face	of	the	whole	earth.’	
But	the	Lord	came	down	to	see	the	city	and	the	
tower	that	the	men	were	building.	The	Lord	said,	‘If	
as	one	people	speaking	the	same	language	they	have	
begun	to	do	this,	then nothing they plan to do will be 
impossible for them (emphasis	added).	Come,	let	us	
go	down	and	confuse	their	language	so	they	will	not	
understand	each	other.’
Jacob	Viner	referred	to	the	preceding	text	as	one	
“which	has	been	an	obstacle	to	acceptance	on	religious	
grounds	of	a	universalistic	or	cosmopolitan	approach	to	
international	relations”	(1972,	p.	48).	Given	this	back-
ground,	it	is	understandable,	at	first	glance,	that	some	
Christians	might	be	inclined	to	reject	any	vision	of	eco-
nomic	life	if	it	appears	to	be	based	entirely	on	utopian	
premises	(Gray,	1998,	p.	20).	But	are	economic	visions	
inherently	utopian	in	nature?	Writing	almost	70	years	
ago,	Karl	Mannheim	maintained	that	“a	state	of	mind	is	
utopian	when	it	is	incongruous	with	the	state	of	reality	
within	which	it	occurs,”	but	that	“we	should	not	regard	
as	utopian	every	state	of	mind	which	is	incongruous	with	
and	transcends	the	immediate	situation”	(1936,	p.	192).	
Instead,	he	limited	his	definition	of	utopian	visions	to	
those	outlooks	“which,	when	they	pass	over	into	conduct,	
tend	to	shatter,	either	partially	or	wholly,	the	order	of	
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things	prevailing	at	the	time”	(1936,	p.	192).	
While	we	certainly	face	our	share	of	global	economic	
challenges	at	the	present	time,	just	as	we	have	in	the	past	
and	will	continue	to	do	in	the	future,	to	argue	that	an	eco-
nomic	order	that	is	derived	from	a	particular	vision,	even	
with	appropriate	legal	and	cultural	constraints,	has	led	to	a	
situation	in	which	“the	prevailing	order	of	things	has	been	
shattered”	would	be	engaging	in	rhetoric	that	is	excessively	
apocalyptic	in	nature.	As	Deirdre	McCloskey	(2010,	p.	
42-43)	has	pointed	out,	democratic	capitalist	economies	
have	been	assailed	by	“doomsday	critics”	from	both	the	
political	left	and	right	for	an	extended	period	of	time.	
There	is	no	guarantee	that	the	future	will	not	produce	“a	
crisis	of	capitalism”	that	is	analogous	to	the	collapse	of	the	
socialist	experiment	in	recent	decades,	and	that	would	be	
even	more	extensive	than	the	financial	crisis	and	global	
recession	of	recent	years.	Such	a	development,	however,	
like	previous	calamities	such	as	the	Great	Depression,	
would	probably	be	due	to	a	number	of	causes	that	are	not	
directly	economic	in	nature	—	political	decisions,	cultural	
conflicts,	and	environmental	factors,	to	name	just	three.	As	
a	case	in	point,	Jean-Francois	Rischard,	former	vice	presi-
dent	for	Europe	of	the	World	Bank,	has	grouped	20	global	
problems,	all	of	which	have	economic	implications,	into	
the	following	three	categories:	issues	involving	the	global	
commons,	issues	whose	size	and	urgency	require	a	global	
response,	and	issues	needing	a	global	regulatory	approach	
(2002,	p.	66;	cited	in	Held,	2004,	p.	12).	Therefore,	one	
of	the	conclusions	of	this	inquiry	is	that	economic	visions	
are	not	intrinsically	utopian	in	nature,	although	our	faith	
should	keep	us	alert	to	the	fact	that	the	potential	for	such	
hubris	among	fallen	human	beings	should	never	be	under-
estimated,	a	lesson	that	is	likely	to	be	readily	understood	in	
the	light	of	recent	history.		
Perhaps	a	greater	challenge	to	the	willingness	of	some	
in	the	Christian	community	to	embrace	the	concept	of	
vision	in	economics	stems	from	the	influence	of	post-
modern	thinking	and	its	rejection	of	meta-narratives,	or	
“big	stories.”	As	an	example	of	this	skepticism,	John	Kay,	
who	is	a	defender	of	a	liberal	market	economy,	has	argued	
that	Marxism	was	“the	most	extensive	‘grand	narrative’”	
(2005,	p.	312)	and	that	“the	true	lesson	of	(its)	failure	is	
not	that	(it)	was	the	wrong	grand	narrative,”	but	instead	
“that	no	such	theories	are	valid”	(2005,	p.	17).		In	spite	
of	Kay’s	conclusion	that	“there	is	no	grand	narrative,	only	
little	stories,”	he	conceded	that	the	search	for	such	explana-
tions	(visions?)	will	continue	because	“the	need	for	grand	
narrative	is	so	firmly	ingrained	in	human	thinking	that	
the	fruitless	search	for	it	will	never	end”	(2005,	p.	355).	
By	contrast,	Iain	Wallace	(1998,	pp.	42-43),	whose	work	
directs	a	significantly	higher	degree	of	criticism	toward	
market	processes	than	Kay’s,	has	observed	that	“this	post-
modern	critique	of	universalizing	metanarratives	has	pro-
found	implications	for	Christians”	because	“we	are	a	peo-
ple	of	the	‘big	story’	and	are	accustomed	to	proclaiming	it	
as	God’s	way	for	the	whole	earth.”	Wallace	expanded	upon	
this	line	of	reasoning	by	maintaining	that	since	Christians	
“have	been	embraced	by	the	love	of	God	and	incorporated	
into	the	community	of	the	church,	we	know	that	there	
is	a	foundational	‘big	story,’	linking	God	redemptively	to	
creation	and	the	human	race”	(1998,	pp.	44-45.)	At	the	
same	time,	Wallace	asserted	that	“we	need	to	acknowledge	
that	our	particular	cultural	(and	dare	we	add,	intellectual?)	
tradition	shapes	and	selectively	filters	the	story,”	to	the	
point	where	“there	is	no	single	definitive	recounting	of	it”	
(1998,	p.45).	The	points	that	Wallace	has	raised	would	
seem	to	support	the	argument	that	Christians	should	not	
be	adverse	to	the	discussion	of	economic	“visions”	as	an	
entire	conceptual	category,	even	though	we	might	have	
reservations	about	the	foundations	or	proposals	associated	
with	any	one	particular	outlook.
CONCLUS ION
John	Stackhouse,	Jr.,	has	observed,	“Some	have	said	
that	North	American	evangelicals	have	generally	tended	
to	treat	economic	systems	as	if	they	were	part	of	the	cli-
mate	or	topography:	realities	simply	to	be	dealt	with	as	
given,	not	as	human	constructs	thus	amenable	to	human	
revision”	(2002,	p.	78).	What	if	we	were	to	assume	that	
the	preceding	statement	is	correct?	Even	if	we	take	into	
consideration	the	observation	that	self-identified	evan-
gelicals	do	not	represent	the	entire	Christian	community,	
this	assumption	would	have	profound	implications	for	the	
possible	contribution	of	believers	(or	lack	of	same)	to	the	
debate	over	economic	institutions,	processes,	and	policies.	
It	could	be	the	case	that	many	Christians	have	decided	to	
focus	on	specific	economic	problems	in	a	piece-meal	fash-
ion	that	may	not	be	all	that	different	from	the	approach	
that	was	previously	described	as	“do-it-yourself	econom-
ics.”	This	tendency	may	also	have	an	influence	on	the	
design	of	instructional	programs	within	Christian	educa-
tional	institutions,	particularly	for	upper-division	students,	
as	well	as	within	congregations	and	para-church	organiza-
tions.	Many	of	these	bodies	have	a	long-standing	emphasis	
on	initiatives	which	are	seen	as	being	“practical”	and	“rele-
vant”	in	nature,	which	means	that	they	might	find	broader	
themes,	such	as	“vision”	in	the	manner	in	which	it	has	
been	defined,	to	be	too	abstract	and	theoretical.	If	so,	it	is	
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worth	considering	whether	this	is	taking	place	not	only	out	
of	a	desire	to	be	of	practical	service	to	others	in	concrete	
situations,	but	also	because	of	a	concern	about	becoming	
tainted	by	the	elements	of	secular	economic	visions	that	
seem	to	be	utopian	in	nature	and	which	do	not	require	
the	intervention	of	God	in	human	affairs.	It	may	also	be	
the	case	that	some	believers	might	wonder	whether	or	not	
acceptance	of	the	biblical	meta-narrative	—	the	ongoing	
work	of	God	in	human	history	as	revealed	in	Scripture	and	
through	the	person	of	Jesus	Christ	—	precludes	endorse-
ment,	even	in	a	limited	and	partial	manner,	of	any	eco-
nomic	visions.	If	this	is	the	case,	is	there	not	a	risk	that	
this	perspective	unnecessarily	limits	the	potential	witness	of	
the	church	in	economic	life	and	the	possible	contribution	
to	human	welfare	that	we	might	make	in	Christ’s	name?	
Consideration	of	this	possibility	reinforces	the	most	impor-
tant	point	of	this	essay:	the	recognition	and	understanding	
of	the	central	role	that	alternative	visions	play	in	shaping	
our	interpretation	of,	and	response	to,	the	“signs	of	the	
economic	times”	as	a	key	element	of	our	individual	and	
collective	ministry	in	this	area	of	life.
	 As	a	final	observation,	perhaps	it	would	serve	us	
well	to	consider	the	words	of	Pope	Benedict	XVI	(2009,	
para.	21;	cited	in	Griffiths,	2010,	p.	116):	
The	current	crisis	obliges	us	to	re-plan	our	journey,	
to	set	ourselves	new	rules	and	to	discover	new	forms	
of	commitment,	to	build	on	positive	experiences,	
and	to	reject	negative	ones.	The	crisis	thus	becomes	
an	opportunity	for	discernment,	in	which	to	shape	a	
new	vision	for	the	future.
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